Ayman Soliman, a beloved former children’s hospital chaplain in the Cincinnati area, was released on today
Ayman Soliman, a beloved former children’s hospital chaplain in the Cincinnati area, has been jailed by Donald Trump’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement since July 9. Soliman was finally released today, multiple sources familiar with the matter tell Rolling Stone.
Just before 1:15 p.m., Adam Allen — one of the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital chaplains who was fired after publicly backing Soliman — said in a brief phone call, “He’s at a mosque.”
The imam’s attorney, Robert Ratliff, confirms that Soliman was released and “headed home,” and that he expects U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to fully reinstate his client’s legal asylum status, which was officially terminated by the Trump administration the month before his arrest.
Ratliff says he is awaiting written confirmation from the government, but he views this as an unequivocal victory, clearing the way for his client to continue seeking his green card and getting his family members from Egypt to America.
The attorney adds that this morning, a staffer at Rep. Greg Landsman’s (D-Ohio) office called him to let him know that they had heard the termination of legal status would be rescinded imminently, and that Soliman would be let out of the Butler County jail within hours. Then, at 12:13 p.m., Ratliff says, he got confirmation from an attorney for the Trump Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that they had filed a motion to dismiss.
“It is 100 percent [good news], absolutely no downside to it,” Soliman’s lawyer says.
Soliman and his advocates have long claimed that if the U.S. government were to return him to Egypt, he would face political retribution, or even death. For years, Soliman has built a reputation in Ohio and northern Kentucky for his work as a chaplain at his former employer, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, where he was widely celebrated for his work that included comforting the parents of severely ill or dying kids.
None of that mattered to Trump and his administration, which jailed him for more than two months, and have been publicly trashing him (based on flimsy so-called evidence) as being connected to Islamist terrorists.
DHS did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment.
Children’s Hospital Chaplain Jailed by Trump Administration Finally Released
Ayman Soliman, a beloved former children’s hospital chaplain in the Cincinnati area, had been jailed by Donald Trump’s administration since July 9.
Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism.
This is the complete text of a Department of Justice study regarding right-wing extremism that the Trump administration has tried to remove from the Internet.
Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism. Since 1990, far-right extremists have committed far more ideologically motivated homicides than far-left or radical Islamist extremists, including 227 events that took more than 520 lives.[1] In this same period, far-left extremists committed 42 ideologically motivated attacks that took 78 lives.[2] A recent threat assessment by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security concluded that domestic violent extremists are an acute threat and highlighted a probability that COVID-19 pandemic-related stressors, long-standing ideological grievances related to immigration, and narratives surrounding electoral fraud will continue to serve as a justification for violent actions.[3]
Over the past 20 years, the body of research that examines terrorism and domestic violent extremism has grown exponentially. Studies have looked at the similarities and differences between radicalization to violent domestic ideologies and radicalization to foreign extremist ideologies. Research has found that radicalization processes and outcomes — and perhaps potential prevention and intervention points — vary by group structure and crime type. In addition, research has explored promising and effective approaches for how communities can respond to radicalization and prevent future attacks.[4]
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has played a unique role in the evolving literature on terrorism and violent extremism. NIJ has promoted the development of comprehensive terrorism databases to help inform criminal justice responses to terrorism, address the risk of terrorism to potential targets, examine the links between terrorism and other crimes, and study the organizational, structural, and cultural dynamics of terrorism. In 2012, the U.S. Congress requested that NIJ build on these focal points by funding “research targeted toward developing a better understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon and advancing evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention.”[5] NIJ has since funded more than 50 research projects on domestic radicalization, which have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism.
This article discusses the findings of several NIJ-supported domestic radicalization studies that cover a range of individual and network-centered risk and protective factors that affect radicalization processes, including military involvement and online environments. The article also explores factors that shape the longevity of radicalization processes and their variation by group structure and crime type, and examines factors that affect pathways away from domestic extremism. It concludes with a discussion of how these findings can inform terrorism prevention strategies, criminal justice policy, and community-based prevention programming.
The Characteristics of U.S. Extremists and Individuals Who Commit Hate Crimes
Over the past two decades, research that seeks to understand individual-level engagement in violent extremism has grown tremendously. However, as the research field has developed, a gap has emerged between the increasingly sophisticated arguments that scholars use to explain extremism and the availability of data to test, refine, and validate theories of radicalization.
In 2012, NIJ funded the Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization project to address the data gap in radicalization research.[6] The project created the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database, a cross-ideological repository of information on the characteristics of U.S. extremists. In 2017, NIJ supported a follow-on project[7] that sought to replicate the PIRUS data for individuals in the United States who commit hate crimes. This project yielded the Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) dataset, the first data resource for researchers and practitioners interested in understanding the risk and protective factors associated with committing hate crimes.
PIRUS and BIAS are designed to provide users with information on a wide range of factors that can play a role in a person’s radicalization to criminal activity.[8] These risk and protective factors can be divided into four domains:[9]
The situational characteristics of the crimes, including whether the acts were premeditated or spontaneous, involved co-conspirators, or were committed while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
The characteristics of the victims, including whether targets were “hard” (for example, military bases, secure facilities) or “soft” (for example, businesses, public areas, private civilians) and whether the individuals had prior relationships with their victims.
Factors that produce the social bonds that may protect against mobilization to violence, such as marriage, military service, work experience, and advanced education.
Factors that may act as radicalization mechanisms and risk factors for violence, such as previous criminal activity, membership in extremist or hate groups, substance use, and mental illness.
The PIRUS and BIAS data have been used to generate insights on a range of important topics related to hate crime and extremism; however, there are three overarching findings common to both datasets: diversity in beliefs, diversity in behaviors, and diversity in characteristics.
Diversity in Beliefs
Although it is not uncommon for a particular ideology to dominate the public discourse around extremism, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes routinely come from across the ideological spectrum, including far-right, far-left, Islamist, or single-issue ideologies. These ideologies break down into particular movements, or sub-ideologies. For instance, in 2018, the PIRUS data identified extremists associated with several anti-government movements, Second Amendment militias, the sovereign citizen movement, white supremacy, ecoterrorism, anarchism, the anti-abortion movement, the QAnon conspiracy theory, and others.[10] The prevalence of particular movements can ebb and flow over time depending on political climate and law enforcement priorities, but at no point in recent U.S. history has one set of beliefs completely dominated extremism or hate crime activity.[11] Furthermore, the PIRUS and BIAS data reveal that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes are often motivated by overlapping views. For instance, it is common for individuals from the anti-government militia movement to adopt views of white supremacy or for those from the extremist environmental movement to take part in anarchist violence. Nearly 17% of the individuals in PIRUS were affiliated with more than one extremist group or sub-ideological movement, and nearly 15% of the individuals in BIAS selected the victims of their hate crimes because of multiple identity characteristics, such as race and sexual orientation.[12]
Diversity in Behaviors
Although radicalization to violence has been a primary topic in extremism and hate crime research, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes often engage in a range of violent and nonviolent criminal activities. Indeed, 42% of PIRUS and nearly 30% of BIAS individual actors engaged exclusively in nonviolent crimes, such as property damage, financial schemes, and illegal demonstrations.[13] Moreover, the violent outcomes represented in the PIRUS and BIAS data vary in scope and type. For instance, approximately 15% of those in BIAS committed or planned to commit mass casualty crimes, while the remaining subjects targeted specific victims.[14] Similarly, nearly 50% of those in BIAS did not premeditate their crimes but rather acted spontaneously after chance encounters with their victims.[15]
Diversity in Characteristics
One of the more common conclusions of recent research on radicalization is that no single profile accurately captures the characteristics of the individuals who commit extremist and hate crimes.[16] The PIRUS and BIAS data support this finding, revealing that background characteristics vary considerably depending on ideological affiliations. For instance, white supremacists in PIRUS tend to be older and less well-educated and are more likely to have criminal histories than those who were inspired by foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or those associated with the extremist environmental or anarchist movements.[17] Despite these differences, some risk and protective factors tend to separate violent from nonviolent individuals, regardless of ideology.[18] In the PIRUS data, individuals with criminal records, documented or suspected mental illness, and membership in extremist cliques are more often classified as violent, while those who are married with stable employment backgrounds are more likely to engage in nonviolent crimes.[19] Similarly, in BIAS, violent individuals are more likely to co-offend with peers, have criminal histories that include acts of violence, and offend while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.[20]
Military Experience and Domestic Violent Extremism
According to current statistics, individuals with military backgrounds represent 11.5% of the total known extremists who have committed violent and nonviolent crimes in the United States since 1990.[21] Although this percentage seems small, there has been a growing trend of (former) military members engaging in extremist offenses in recent years. An average of seven people with U.S. military backgrounds per year committed extremist crimes between 1990 and 2010. That rate has risen to an average of 29 people per year over the past decade. Also worth noting is that more than half (52%) of extremists with military experience are identified as violent.
Given the growth of violent domestic extremism among military personnel, the relationship between military service and radicalization has become a major concern. Prior NIJ-funded studies have identified military experience as a potential risk factor for attempted and actual terrorism.[22] The likelihood of radicalization and radicalization to violence increases when individuals have already left military service.[23] This research suggests that military service is not a social bond that inhibits extremist violence.
NIJ studies have also shown that individuals with military experience may be susceptible to recruitment by domestic violent extremist groups due to their unique skills, which an extremist group may perceive as contributing to the success of a terrorist attack.[24] Also, transitioning from military to civilian life appears to be a pull factor for engaging in violent extremism.[25] Indicators for potential involvement in extremism may include a lack of a sense of community, purpose, and belonging. If these indicators are identified early, community stakeholders — in partnership with military agencies — could have an opportunity to intervene. Although such knowledge is valuable, the role of military service in radicalization to violent extremism still requires study.
Differences in Violent Extremist Characteristics Between Military Veterans and Civilians
In 2019, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Southern California to study the link between military service and violent domestic extremism. They are also examining the differences between military veteran and civilian extremists in terms of their characteristics and social networks.[26] Although this study is ongoing, preliminary findings have been drawn from a secondary analysis of the American Terrorism Study data, which contain information on people federally indicted for terrorism-related crimes by the U.S. government between 1980 and 2002.[27] With these data, the researchers compared the demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics among military veterans and civilians. The demographic characteristics considered were age, race, sex, marital status, and education level. The homegrown violent extremist characteristics consisted of the length of group membership, type of terrorist group, role in the group, mode of recruitment into the group, primary target, and the state of indictment.
The research team observed significant differences between military veteran and civilian extremists across both demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics. First, they found that military veteran and civilian extremists differed with respect to age, sex, and marital status. Specifically, individuals with military service who engaged in homegrown violent extremism were more likely to be older, male, and in marital or cohabiting relationships than civilians who engaged in homegrown violent extremism. Second, analyses revealed that, compared to civilian extremists, military veteran extremists had greater affiliations with right-wing terrorist groups (versus left-wing, international, or other terrorist groups) and were more likely to hold leadership positions within these groups and either initiate a terrorist group or unite groups together. Finally, other than government/federal officials or buildings, which were the primary targets across all groups, the primary targets of veterans were diverse social groups, such as those belonging to racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups.
Implications of Transitioning Out of Military Service
The University of Southern California researchers intend to supplement these results by interviewing members from the social networks of military veterans and civilians who committed homegrown violent extremism between 2003 and 2019. The findings produced thus far are important, especially because the association between military experience and terrorism is understudied. Ultimately, these results suggest that people who transition from active duty to veteran status experience a nuanced, complex, and potentially lifelong process. Veterans who encounter difficulties during this transition and desire — but lack — a sense of community, purpose, and belonging after leaving the military may be attracted to the pull of domestic extremist groups. In these groups, veterans can lead and collaborate with others of similar ideologies to accomplish a shared mission akin to what they did in the military. For example, the military veterans in this study largely endorsed right-wing values; thus, perhaps something about the narratives of right-wing extremist groups compensates for the void felt when leaving military service. With such insights in mind, researchers recommend forming partnerships among civilians, the military, and veteran communities to identify and prevent violent extremism among U.S. veterans.
Longevity of Terrorist Plots in the United States
A major question for researchers and counterterrorism officials is how to prevent the next act of terrorism or violent extremism from occurring. As such, much attention has been paid to disrupted plots and successful interdiction tactics that ultimately led to arrest and indictment. Less attention has been given to what those responsible for acts of terrorism and violent extremism do to successfully evade detection and arrest. In other words, the focus has not been on what terrorists and violent extremists are doing “right.”
In 2013, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Arkansas’ Terrorism Research Center to study the sequencing of precursor behaviors for individuals who have been federally indicted in the United States for charges related to terrorism and domestic violent extremism.[28] Based on preliminary analyses, the researchers somewhat serendipitously observed lifespan differences between lone actors and those operating in small cells or more formalized groups. Consequently, it warranted a more comprehensive examination of the factors that increased the likelihood of terrorists and violent extremists evading arrest. NIJ funded the researchers to identify behaviors that improved the chances of plot longevity — or the ability for terrorists to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture by law enforcement — for individuals federally indicted on terrorism-related charges.[29]
Data on the longevity of terrorism and violent extremism plots come from the American Terrorism Study, the longest-running project on terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. With NIJ funding that began in 2003,[30] the American Terrorism Study maintains the most comprehensive dataset on temporally linked precursor behaviors and outcomes of terrorism and violent extremism plots. To examine plot longevity, the Arkansas researchers[31] limited their analyses to 346 federally indicted individuals who were linked to the planning or completion of a terrorist attack in the United States from 1980 to 2015. Longevity, or duration of their “terrorist lifespan,” is based on the date of a person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity and their “neutralizing” date (usually the date of arrest).
One of the key findings from this research is a correlation between significant declines in the lifespan of individual terrorists and major changes to the U.S. Attorney General guidelines established to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the United States. For example, those who began in the mid- to late 1970s, following Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act, had a median longevity of 2,230 days. In contrast, the median lifespan of terrorists who began operating in the mid-1980s decreased to 1,067 days. Later, in the early 2000s, it fell even further to 99 days, which reflects the FBI’s tighter focus on terrorism and violent extremism and guidelines granting law enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed.
The researchers also found that the lifespans of terrorists and violent extremists vary significantly depending on key attributes, such as ideology, sex, and educational attainment. For example, environmental and extreme left-wing violent extremists tend to sustain themselves for relatively long periods of time (5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively), while the longevity of extreme right-wing and radical Islamist terrorists is, on average, two years or less.
Females federally indicted on charges related to terrorism and violent extremism also tend to have increased longevity compared to male terrorists and violent extremists, perhaps because of females’ disproportionate representation in longer-lasting extreme left-wing and environmental movements, as well as increased representation in left-wing group leadership roles. Females involved in terrorism and extremism are usually more educated, which is also associated with extended longevity. Further, females who play support roles in terrorism and extremist groups — as is more often the case for right-wing extremists and radical Islamist terrorists — also appear to have longer lifespans. In contrast, males have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior and actual incident participation than females. Both types of behavior are significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and would be expected to shorten the longevity of both male and female terrorists and violent extremists.
Finally, longevity also depends on a plot’s sophistication and the extent of the planning required to carry it out. Less sophisticated plans or executed plots, or those using simpler and less advanced weapons, are generally associated with longer lifespans for terrorists and violent extremists. More sophisticated plots may provide greater potential for missteps by terrorists and violent extremists and leads for law enforcement. Additionally, more sophisticated plots are associated with more meetings with accomplices and necessitate extra preparation. Importantly, both the number of meetings and preparatory activities have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents, suggesting that early intervention or arrest are also linked to these two factors.
How Domestic Terrorists Use the Internet
Terrorists and terrorist groups use the internet to share propaganda and recruit new members. The internet provides a platform to strengthen their members’ commitment to the cause, encourage radicalized individuals to act, and coordinate legal and illegal activities. A recently published meta-analysis concluded, “Exposure to radical content online appears to have a larger relationship with radicalization than other media-related risk factors (for example, television usage, media exposure), and the impact of this relationship is most pronounced for the behavioral outcomes of radicalization.”[32]
In 2014, NIJ funded a study to develop a deeper understanding of what domestic terrorists discuss on the internet.[33] The study analyzed 18,120 posts from seven online web forums by and for individuals interested in the ideological far right. The research team read each post’s content and coded it for either quantitative or qualitative analyses depending on the project’s objective.
The project provided several important insights into terrorist use of the internet. First, the web forums included discussions about a variety of beliefs, such as gun rights, conspiracy theories, hate-based sentiments, and anti-government beliefs; however, the intensity of ideological expression was generally weak. The nature of the online environments that far-right groups use likely facilitates the diffusion of ideological agendas.
Second, the amount and type of involvement in these forums played a key role in radicalization. Posting behaviors changed over time. Users grew more ideological and radical as other users reinforced their ideas and connected their ideas to those from other forums. (It is important to note that the study focused on online expression and not conversion to offline violence.)
Third, far-right extremists were primarily interested in general technology issues. Discussions focused on encryption tools and methods (such as Tor), internet service providers and social media platforms, and law enforcement actions to surveil illicit activities online. These far-right extremists appeared more interested in defensive actions than sophisticated schemes for radicalization or offensive actions such as criminal cyberattacks.
The study used social network analyses to visualize user communications and network connections, focusing on individuals’ responses to posts made within threads to highlight interconnected associations between actors. The social network analyses indicated that far-right forums have a low network density, which suggests a degree of information recycling between key actors. The redundant connections between actors may slow the spread of new information. As a result, such forums may inefficiently distribute new knowledge due to their relatively insular nature. They may also be generally difficult to disrupt, as the participants’ language and behaviors reinforce others and create an echo chamber. These networks are similar to others observed in computer hacker communities and data theft forums,[34] which suggests that there may be consistencies in the nature of online dialogue regardless of the content.
The study also indicated that extreme external events usually did not affect posting behaviors. However, there were significant differences associated with conspiratorial, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant posts after the Boston Marathon bombing. It may be that violence or major disruptive events inspired by jihadist ideologies draw great responses from far-right groups relative to their own actions. The same appears to be true for the 2012 presidential election; the study observed increases both in the number of posts in the month after the election and in overt signs of individual ties or associations to far-right movements through self-claim posts, movement-related signatures, and usernames. These findings are consistent with other recent work comparing online mobilization after the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections.[35]
Entering and Exiting White Supremacy in the United States
An NIJ-funded research team led by RTI International examined the complex social-psychological processes involved with entering, mobilizing, and exiting white supremacy in the United States.[36] The researchers conducted in-depth life history interviews with 47 former members of white supremacist groups in 24 states and two provinces in Canada.[37]
For this project, white supremacy referred to groups that reject essential democratic ideals, equality, and tolerance. A key organizing principle is that inherent differences between races and ethnicities position white and European ancestry above all others. Those interviewed were authoritarian, anti-liberal, or militant nationalists who had a general intolerance toward people of color. They had used violence to achieve their goals and supported a race war to eradicate the world of nonwhite people.[38]
The study led to several key findings about entering and exiting white supremacy in the United States.
Hate as Outcome
The study found that most people do not join white supremacist groups because they are adherents of a particular ideology. Rather, a combination of background factors increases the likelihood that someone will be susceptible to recruitment messaging (for example, propaganda).[39] Previous research has highlighted that hate or adherence to racist violence was an outcome of participation in white supremacist groups.[40] The commitment to white supremacist groups lacked a preexisting sense of racial grievance or hatred that motivated an individual to join the racist movement.[41] One former member reported having “no inkling of what [Nazism] really was other than what you saw on TV.”[42] The NIJ-funded study found that people joined white supremacist groups because they were angry, lonely, and isolated, and they were looking for opportunities to express their rage.[43]
Vulnerabilities as Precondition
The former white supremacists had various personal, psychological, and social vulnerabilities that made them strive for what psychologists have framed as developing a new possible self.[44] High levels of negative life experiences — including, but not limited to, maladjustment, abuse, and family instability — potentially make a person imagine a new, different, and more fulfilled self.[45] They can imagine an empowered future self with friends and a purpose. Extremist recruiters prey on these desires. The former white supremacists indicated high levels of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse as children; strained personal relationships; and general difficulties throughout their lives. These struggles made white supremacy seem like an improvement to their sense of self, as the group came with a ready-made set of friends, social events, and camaraderie among individuals with similarly rough pasts. Besides these social benefits, white supremacist groups provided members with a deeper sense of belonging and explanation for their life troubles, rooted in a sense of racial pride and empowerment.
Gradual, Nonlinear Exit
Most white supremacists in this country do not remain members for life. Rather, group membership is often temporary (but not always short-lived), and many become disillusioned and burnt out over time. The study showed that the exit process is gradual, as the former white supremacists reported slowly becoming dissatisfied with the ideology, tactics, or politics of a group.[46] They described an identity that became filled with negative encounters with other members, even breeding distrust. White supremacy requires the development of a totalizing identity that results in isolating members from nonextremists. This marginalization fosters a sense of social stigma that makes white supremacy less attractive and further supports disengagement and deradicalization processes.
This research reported that emotional dynamics create trajectories of development and decline in white supremacy and the role of disillusionment among the reasons why members exit the organization.[47] These analyses offer an explanation for how white supremacist organizations maintain solidarity even though many individuals stay in groups after losing their ideological commitment. They also demonstrate that exit from a group is a nonlinear process.[48] Meanwhile, in other analyses, the study team reported that, even after an individual exits a group, their white supremacist identity lingers with a residual effect.[49] That research likened hate to an addiction that creates an uncontrollable emotional, social, and cognitive hold over adherents, which has the ability to pull former members back into hate almost against their will.[50] The former white supremacists shared experiences in which music, environments, and images created desire, longing, and curiosity about their old lifestyle within the organization.
Opportunities
The NIJ-funded study found several blind spots in terms of identification and awareness among criminal legal system practitioners and other responders. This resulted in several missed opportunities for intervention and practical solutions. Exhibit 1 details four areas in which the study findings can contribute to criminal justice policy and practice.[51]
Exhibit 1. Missed Opportunities for Intervention and Practical Solutions
The results of the NIJ-funded studies discussed in this article have several implications for policy and practice. First, they illustrate that extremism is complex and that successfully countering it will require a unified response that bridges law enforcement, community partners, health officials, and concerned citizens. To facilitate a shared understanding of the extremist threat, stakeholders engaged in counterextremism efforts routinely use findings from these studies to provide training to concerned family and friends about potential radicalization warning signs and how best to respond. They also use the findings to educate law enforcement, corrections and probation officers, and mental health professionals on the complexity of radicalization so they can accurately gauge and respond to extremism in their communities. These types of training initiatives will remain critical to counterextremism efforts as the threat continues to evolve.
Second, the studies highlight the importance of focusing criminal justice resources on domestic extremism. Although international terrorist organizations remain a threat, these studies show that domestic extremists continue to be responsible for most terrorist attacks in the United States. Historically, far fewer resources have been dedicated to the study of domestic extremism, leaving gaps in our understanding about terrorist trends, recruitment and retention processes, and online behaviors. Due in large part to NIJ’s commitment to funding research on domestic radicalization, considerable progress has recently been made in addressing these topics. But this work will need to continue if we hope to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape.
Finally, the studies highlight the need for communitywide partnerships that link government and nongovernment organizations in support of community-level prevention and intervention programs. Law enforcement and criminal justice resources for countering extremism are finite and scarce, making it imperative that we focus our research and support efforts on understanding what occurs before a crime takes place. As the studies reviewed in this article show, there is often an opportunity to intervene to help individuals exit extremism before they engage in criminal activity. Similarly, prevention efforts are needed in digital spaces where extremist narratives often flourish. Achieving these goals will require community members, policymakers, and practitioners to commit to supporting counterextremism efforts.
About This Article
This article was published as part of NIJ Journal issue number 285. This article discusses the following awards:
Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position, policies, terminology, or posture of the U.S. Department of Justice on domestic violent extremism. The content is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.
[note 8] The PIRUS and BIAS datasets are based on the same data collection methodologies and share similar goals. Both contain random samples of individuals who committed crimes in the United States that were motivated by their extremist ideologies or hate beliefs. The PIRUS dataset includes 2,225 individuals from 1948 to 2018, and BIAS is based on 966 cases from 1990 to 2018. Both datasets are collected entirely from public sources, including court records, online and print news, and public social media accounts. Both seek to capture individuals who promoted a range of extremist ideologies and hate beliefs. PIRUS, for instance, includes those whose crimes were associated with anti-government, white supremacist, environmental, anarchist, jihadist, and conspiracy theory movements. Similarly, BIAS includes individuals who selected victims based on their race, ethnicity, and nationality; sexual orientation; religious affiliation; age; or disability.
[note 21] Unless otherwise noted, all data reported in this section originate from Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, Radicalization in the Ranks: An Assessment of the Scope and Nature of Criminal Extremism in the United States Military, College Park, MD: START, January 2022. In this project, extremists with military backgrounds consisted of active and nonactive personnel from all military branches and reserves, aside from the Space Force and Coast Guard Reserves. Individuals who were honorably discharged, dishonorably discharged, or otherwise violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice were excluded from the study. Also excluded were those discharged through court martial unless information about their criminal proceedings was publicly available.
[note 34] Thomas J. Holt and Adam M. Bossler, “Issues in the Prevention of Cybercrime,” in Cybercrime in Progress: Theory and Prevention of Technology-Enabled Offenses (New York: Routledge, 2016), 136-168.
[note 37] The project included three human rights groups (Anti-Defamation League, Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Southern Poverty Law Center) and Life After Hate, an organization that assists white supremacists in exiting the movement. The project partners helped develop a semi-structured interview protocol and provided contact information for initial interviewees. The study used a snowballing technique from these initial interviewees to identify former white supremacists who were in the public sphere to determine if they were interested in being interviewed. The interviews were conducted in places where the individuals would be comfortable, including hotel rooms, homes, places of work, coffee shops, restaurants, and parks. The interviews were in-depth accounts (lasting 6-8 hours each) of individuals’ backgrounds (for example, how they grew up), entry into white supremacy (for example, how they learned about the movement), mobilization (for example, rank and use of violence), and exit process (for example, initial doubts and barriers to exit). The completion of the project was a collaboration with equal contributions from Kathleen Blee, Matthew DeMichele, and Pete Simi and support from Mehr Latif and Steven Windisch.
NIJ-funded research projects have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism.
What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism
Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism.
Shoppers are reporting they were hit with surprise charges from international shipping carriers, resulting from the expiration of the exemption on import duties for items under $800.
At the end of August, de minimis goods (small-dollar items) began facing import duties when being shipped into the U.S., meaning personalized small orders are now facing sizable tariffs from its trading partners.
“We encourage customers to take note of the shipping policies of the brands they shop with and to also remember that tariffs are payable to the U.S. government,” said a DHL representative.
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection made it clear that the logistics industry has continued to operate without a problem since the new de minimis rules took effect.
“Foreign carriers and postal operators were given clear timelines, detailed guidance, and multiple options to comply. The only thing ending on August 29 is the pathway that has been used by criminals to exploit America’s borders,” acknowledged Susan S. Thomas, CBP.
The Trump administration has made billions in revenue from the tariff rules implemented in recent months.
A legal aid group has sued to preemptively block any efforts by the U.S. government to deport a dozen Honduran children, saying it had “credible” information that such plans were quietly in the works.
In a statement, the organization said it had received reports that the U.S. government will “imminently move forward with a plan to illegally remove Honduran children in government custody as soon as this weekend, in direct violation of their right to seek protection in the United States and despite ongoing litigation that blocked similar attempted extra-legal removals for children from Guatemala.”
FIRRP did not immediately provide The Associated Press with details about what information it had received about the possible deportation of Honduran children. The amendment to the organization’s lawsuit is sealed in federal court. The Homeland Security Department did not immediately respond to email requests for comment on Friday and Saturday.
The Justice Department on Saturday provided what is perhaps its most detailed account of a chaotic Labor Day weekend involving the attempted deportation of 76 Guatemalan children. Its timeline was part of a request to lift a temporary hold on their removal.
Over Labor Day weekend, the Trump administration attempted to remove Guatemalan children who had come to the U.S. alone and were living in shelters or with foster care families in the U.S.
Advocates who represent migrant children in court filed lawsuits across the country seeking to stop the government from removing the children, and on Sunday a federal judge stepped in to order that the kids stay in the U.S. for at least two weeks.
The government initially identified 457 Guatemalan children for possible deportation, according to Saturday’s filing. None could have a pending asylum screening or claim, resulting in the removal of 91. They had to have parents or legal guardians in Guatemala and be at least 10 years old.
In the end, 327 children were found eligible for deportation, including 76 who boarded planes early Sunday in what the government described as a first phase, according to a statement by Angie Salazar, acting director of the U.S. Health and Human Services Department’s Office of Refugee Resettlement. All 76 were at least 14 years old and “self-reported” that they had a parent or legal guardian in Guatemala but none in the United States.
The Justice Department said no planes took off, despite a comment by one of its attorneys in court Sunday that one may have but returned.
Children who cross the border alone are generally transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, which falls under the Health and Human Services Department. The children usually live in a network of shelters across the country that are overseen by the resettlement office until they are eventually released to a sponsor — usually a relative
Children began crossing the border alone in large numbers in 2014, peaking at 152,060 in the 2022 fiscal year. July’s arrest tally translates to an annual clip of 5,712 arrests, reflecting how illegal crossings have dropped to their lowest levels in six decades.
Guatemalans accounted for 32% of residents at government-run holding facilities last year, followed by Hondurans, Mexicans and El Salvadorans. A 2008 law requires children to appear before an immigration judge with an opportunity to pursue asylum, unless they are from Canada and Mexico. The vast majority are released from shelters to parents, legal guardians or immediate family while their cases wind through court.
Justice Department lawyers said federal law allows the Department of Health and Human Services to “repatriate” or “reunite” children by taking them out of the U.S., as long as the child hasn’t been a victim of “severe” human trafficking, is not at risk for becoming so if he or she is returned to their native country and does not face a “a credible fear” of persecution there. The child also cannot be “repatriated” if he or she has a pending asylum claim.
The FIRRP lawsuit was amended to include 12 children from Honduras who have expressed to the Florence Project that they do not want to return to Honduras, as well as four additional children from Guatemala who have come into government custody in Arizona since the suit was initially filed last week.
Some children have parents who are already in the United States.
The lawsuit demands that the government allow the children their legal right to present their cases to an immigration judge, to have access to legal counsel and to be placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.
Legal aid group sues to preemptively block U.S. from deporting a dozen Honduran children
A legal aid group has sued to preemptively block any efforts by the U.S. government to deport a dozen Honduran children, saying it had “credible” information that such plans were quietly in the works.
Matthew Morrison, a 69-year-old Irish immigrant and nurse in Missouri who became an immigration example in the late 1990s, left for Ireland on July 21 after living in the United States for 40 years due to fears of removal by the Trump administration.
Why It Matters
Morrison’s self-deportation has brought further attention to the complicated realities faced by long-term undocumented immigrants in the U.S., especially those with historic convictions or high-profile political backgrounds. His case, uniquely tied to historic U.S.–Ireland relations, was previously referenced during the Clinton administration as part of U.S.’s efforts to support the Northern Ireland peace process.
Morrison’s departure also underscores the anxiety and uncertainty experienced by noncitizens who fear changes in immigration enforcement policies, particularly those perceived to be at higher risk during political shifts.
What To Know
Morrison worked for roughly 20 years as a psychiatric nurse supervisor in Missouri, including stints at a children’s hospital and several state mental health facilities. He also presented at the St. Louis County Police Academy on topics including mental health and de-escalation tactics.
He told The Marshall Project that he voluntarily left the U.S. due to fear of detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under President Donald Trump‘s administration.
“I would bite the dust in an ICE holding cell,” Morrison said prior to going home to Ireland. “There is nothing to stop them from deporting me to Ecuador, South Sudan or whatever. It’s really gotten insane here. It’s crazy what they are doing now, the Trump administration. You know what I mean?”
Morrison told The Marshall Project that although his work authorization expires in October, he didn’t want to spend the next few months in anxiety worrying about being deported.
On July 21, he and his wife reportedly boarded a one-way flight from Cleveland to Dublin and left behind a life in the St. Louis area that includes grown children, grandchildren and friends.
“I’ve come full circle,” Morrison said. “I came here as an immigrant and I am leaving as an immigrant, despite everything in between. The whole thing is a crazy, stressful situation.”
Morrison first arrived in the U.S. in the mid-1980s after serving time in prison in Northern Ireland due to his involvement with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during “The Troubles.”
In 1985, he married his American pen pal, Francie Broderick, and had two children, Matt and Katie. Morrison later remarried to his current wife, Sandra Riley Swift.
He once served as a symbolic figure in American–Irish diplomacy. The former member of IRA previously spent 10 years in prison, convicted of attempted murder in a 1976 raid on a British barracks. Other ex-IRA men, all in the New York area, faced deportation for similar reasons.
In 1995, Morrison’s wife flew to Belfast while President Bill Clinton was in the region, attempting to garner his attention and protect him from deportation, according to the Associated Press. By 1997, the family received more than $70,000 in donations to help with legal fees.
The case for Morrison and others like him drew support from local and international lawmakers, notably due to IRA members being characterized by the U.S. government as terrorists.
The Missouri Legislature passed a resolution in 1996 urging the Immigration and Naturalization Service to drop deportation proceedings against him. Members of the Derry City Council in Northern Ireland followed suit across party lines, approving a resolution urging Clinton to suspend his deportation.
Morrison’s struggle won support from countless Americans, including neighbors in this suburban St. Louis community to state legislators to members of Congress.
The Irish Northern Aid, a nonprofit organization that helps families of Irish political prisoners, and the Ancient Order of Hibernians also have come to his defense.
In 2000, the Clinton administration ultimately terminated the deportation process against Morrison and five others. Then-Attorney General Janet Reno said in a statement that she had been advised by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to drop deportation proceedings to “support and promote the process of reconciliation that has begun in Northern Ireland.”
Clinton at the time said the termination was “in no way approving or condoning their past criminal acts.” However, the ex-president echoed the sentiment of contributing to peace in Europe.
What People Are Saying
Matthew Morrison’s son, Matt, 37, to The Marshall Project about his father’s scheduled check-in with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in June in St. Louis: “We were terrified that they were just going to take him right there…He has to live under that fear of somebody knocking on the door and dragging him out of the house, just like they did in Derry when he was young. I hate it. I am just worried about him. Until recently, I hadn’t heard him cry about it.”
Morrison’s daughter, Katie, to The Marshall Project: “Even though he’s still alive, I feel like I am grieving. It’s a huge loss for me and my children.”
What Happens Next?
Swift has a house in St. Charles, Missouri, as well as family in the U.S., The Marshall Project reported. After helping Morrison transition into an apartment in the town where he grew up, she wrote in a social media post that she’s going to travel between both countries for a while.
Nurse in US for 40 years self-deports—“It’s really gotten insane”
“I’ve come full circle,” Matthew Morrison said. “I came here as an immigrant and I am leaving as an immigrant, despite everything in between.”
The State Department is proposing a rule requiring some business and tourist visa applicants to post a bond of up to $15,000 to enter the United States, a step critics say could put the process out of reach for many.
According to a notice set for publication on Tuesday in the Federal Register, the department plans a 12‑month pilot program targeting applicants from countries with high visa overstay rates and weak internal document security.
Under the plan, applicants could be required to post bonds of $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000 when applying for a visa.
Why It Matters
This move marks a significant escalation in the Trump administration’s approach to immigration enforcement and revisits a controversial measure briefly introduced during Trump’s first term.
A previous version of the policy was issued in November 2020, but was never fully enacted due to the collapse in global travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. That version targeted about two dozen countries, most of them in Africa, with overstay rates exceeding 10 percent.
What To Know
The new visa bond program will take effect on August 20, according to documents reviewed by Newsweek and a notice previewed Monday on the Federal Register website. The Department of Homeland Security says the goal is to ensure the U.S. government doesn’t incur costs when a visitor violates visa terms.
“Aliens applying for visas as temporary visitors for business or pleasure and who are nationals of countries identified by the department as having high visa overstay rates, where screening and vetting information is deemed deficient, or offering citizenship by investment, if the alien obtained citizenship with no residency requirement, may be subject to the pilot program,” it said.
Under the plan, U.S. consular officers can require a bond from visa applicants who meet certain criteria. This includes nationals of countries with high visa overstay rates, countries with deficient screening and vetting, and those that offer citizenship-by-investment programs, particularly where citizenship is granted without a residency requirement.
Visitors subject to the bond will receive it back upon leaving the U.S., naturalizing as a citizen, or in the event of death. If a traveler overstays, however, the bond may be forfeited and used to help cover the costs associated with their removal.
Citizens of countries in the Visa Waiver Program are exempt, and consular officers will retain the discretion to waive the bond on a case-by-case basis.
What Countries Could End Up Being Affected
The U.S. government has not provided an estimate of how many applicants may be affected. However, 2023 data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection shows that countries with particularly high visa overstay rates include Angola, Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Cabo Verde, Burkina Faso, and Afghanistan.
The list of affected countries will be published at least 15 days before the program begins and may be updated with similar notice. In the 2020 version of the pilot, countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Chad, Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were included.
What People Are Saying
The public notice stated: “The Pilot Program will help the Department assess the continued reliance on the untested historical assumption that imposing visa bonds to achieve the foreign policy and national security goals of the United States remains too cumbersome to be practical.”
Andrew Kreighbaum, a journalist covering immigration, posted on X: “It’s getting more expensive for many business and tourist travelers to enter the U.S. On top of new visa integrity fees, the State Department is imposing visa bonds as high as $15,000.”
What Happens Next
Visa bonds have been proposed in the past but have not been implemented. The State Department has traditionally discouraged the requirement because of the cumbersome process of posting and discharging a bond and because of possible misperceptions by the public.
There’s always a country that wants your money — go where you’re wanted and the heck with Amerika!
Trump administration announces major tourist visa change
The State Department says the measure is intended to ensure the government does not incur costs if a visitor violates visa terms.
President Donald Trump’s administration has drawn up a draft of guidelines to block non-U.S. citizens from having children on U.S. soil and becoming citizens.
The Constitution details “birthright citizenship” in the 14th Amendment, saying that anybody born on American soil belongs to the nation. The Trump administration has tried to block that with an executive order.
Speaking to MSNBC, Slate legal analyst Mark Joseph Stern said the guidelines are a backdoor effort to reinstate the family separation policy from the early days of the first Trump administration. In that case, the government took children from their parents when they came into the U.S. In some instances, the children were given to a host family, while others were thrown in a “detention center.”
“For months, federal courts have prevented the U.S. government from even beginning to plan the implementation of this executive order, finding that it violated the 14th Amendment,” said Stern, noting that the Supreme Court then stepped in to allow it.
“What we see is that this administration doesn’t plan to give any kind of grace period to the children of undocumented immigrants. It will render them noncitizens and deportable from the moment of birth,” clarified Stern.
“The administration has also repealed a 14-year-old rule that barred ICE from entering and committing enforcement actions in and around hospitals. So, the government now has a setup where it can send ICE agents into maternity wards, as you said, to monitor births to demand papers from new mothers and fathers, and to potentially take away and deport their children, their infants, from the moment they’re born. If the parents can’t prove citizenship to their satisfaction.”
Under the new memo, there are about a dozen new classifications of people who will have their U.S. citizenship taken away.
“In fact, the trump administration has already started to quietly reintroduce family separation by relaxing restrictions that had been imposed over the last few years to prevent it from happening,” Stern noted. “The government seems ready to take away infants from their parents if they deem it necessary to effectuate immigration laws. And if this order takes effect, that baby would be deportable upon birth.”
Worse, he said, those infants could be taken, denied citizenship, and under Supreme Court rulings, they could be deported to a third-party country in which they or their parents haven’t set foot.
“This would be like family separation in the first administration on steroids, with a hugely disproportionate impact on the youngest and most vulnerable among us,” he characterized.
‘Family separation on steroids’: Expert lays into Trump plan to target newborn babies
President Donald Trump is trying to deport a Russian man who passed the U.S. screening process for asylum. The U.S. government has also taken away his son.
Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, a senior fellow at the American Immigration Council, posted an excerpt of a New York Times report revealing that the man fled to the United States after his wife was locked up for her political views.
Pavel Snegir and his 11-year-old son, Aleksandr, already passed the initial screening and confirmed that if Snegir is sent back to Russia, he will likely be tortured.
“But the Trump admin is still trying to deport him anyway, and has taken away his son until he agrees to be deported,” wrote Reichlin-Melnick.
Snegir and his son had been in ICE custody, but in May he was taken to an airport in San Diego. He was told he could take his son to the court hearing in New York. But once they were at the airport, Snegir was scared to board the plane, convinced he was about to be deported back to Russia.
“Later that day, after the flight had left, an ICE official told him he would be separated from his son because he refused to be deported,” the report said.
Snegir said he refused to give the government his child. ICE followed with threats he’d be thrown “to the ground, handcuffed and taken away if he did not relent.”
He didn’t move and “everything she promised happened,” Snegir recalled.
His son witnessed the whole ordeal. He previously watched his mother be taken by the Russian government, too.
Now, ICE is telling Snegir that he can self-deport back to Russia, or they’ll deport him anyway, without his son. They claimed he may never see his son again.
Snegir relented, but the following day, he was approved under the protection screening, which means ICE can deport him, but he can’t be sent to Russia.
This week, the administration also published its guidance on birthright citizenship, which will allow ICE to enter maternity wards and demand papers from families after their infants are born. If the parents can’t prove their citizenship, the government can take the newborn away from its parents and deport it to whatever country it wants, one legal analyst described.
ICE seizes 11-year-old to force dad’s deportation — despite torture risk
The withholding of a removal order that Reza Zavvar felt protected him from deportation is now being wielded by the Trump administration to send him to a country he doesn’t know.
Sharp knocks on the front door interrupted Firouzeh Firouzabadi’s Saturday morning coffee. On the porch of her suburban Maryland home were two law enforcement agents and a very familiar pit bull mix named Duke.
“Can you take this dog?” Firouzabadi recalled one of the men saying. “I said, ‘This is my son’s dog. Where is he?’ They wouldn’t say.”
At that moment, her adult son, Reza Zavvar, was handcuffed in the back of an SUV parked two houses down in the Gaithersburg neighborhood where the Iranian-born family has lived since 2009 — apprehended, he later said, that late June day by at least five federal immigration agents in tactical gear who told Zavvar they had been waiting for him to take Duke out for his regular morning walk.
More than a month later, Zavvar, 52, remains in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody,part of a surge of arrests of immigrants with standing court orders barring their deportation to their native countries.
The Trump administration has increasingly turned to sending people to third countries. In court papers, ICE said it plans to send Zavvar to Australia or Romania. He has no ties to either place.
Zavvar left Tehran alone when he was 12, arriving in Virginia in 1985 on a student visa secured by his parents as a way to escape eventual conscription into the Iranian army. He eventually received U.S. asylum, and then a green card.
His family joined him and they settled in Maryland, but in his 20s, Zavvar’s guilty pleas in two misdemeanor marijuana possession cases jeopardized his immigration status. In 2007, an immigration judge issued a withholding of removal order, determining it was unsafe for Zavvar to return to Iran. He built a life, went to college and has been working as a white-collar recruiter for a consulting firm.
…
So he pleaded guilty 27 years ago to a couple marijuana possessions charges (legal today in 24-40 states, depending on purpose of usage) and now ICE wants to deport him to a third country (possibly Romania or Australia).
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He left Iran 40 years ago. He may be deported to Romania. Or Australia.
Handcuffed outside his Maryland home while walking his dog, Reza Zavvar is among a surging number of immigrants arrested with standing court orders barring deportation to their native countries.
An email to officers whose agencies partner with ICE has even some sheriffs who support the Trump administration and its immigration crackdown seeing red.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is newly flush with billions from the “One Big Beautiful Bill” spending legislation and under pressure to rapidly hire 10,000 new agents. But one tactic it recently tried to do that hiring — aggressively recruiting new agents from some of its most trusted local law enforcement partners — may have alienated some of the leaders it needs to help execute what the Trump administration wants to be the largest mass deportation in US history.
“We’re their force multipliers, and this is the thanks we get for helping them do their job?” Polk County, Florida Sheriff Grady Judd said in an interview with NBC News. Judd said he’s not happy about a recruitment email sent by ICE’s deputy director to hundreds of his deputies and he blamed Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, who oversees ICE.
“Kristi Noem needs to get on her big girl pants and do what’s right. She needs to make sure that there’s an apology,” said Judd, who also made clear that he wants to “support President [Donald] Trump’s mission.”
NBC News spoke to local law enforcement leaders in four states whose agencies participate in 287(g) and whose deputies were being targeted for ICE recruitment.
The recruitment email those agencies’ officers received, sent earlier this week, appears to have targeted law enforcement officers whose agencies participate in ICE’s 287(g) program, under which local officers are deputized to help in immigration enforcement.
The email from Sheahan, which NBC News has obtained, reads in part, “As someone who is currently supporting ICE through the 287(g) program, you understand the unique responsibility we carry in protecting our communities and upholding federal law. Your experience in state or local law enforcement brings invaluable insight and skills to this mission —qualities we need now more than ever.”
The email also touts potential $50,000 signing bonuses as an incentive for joining ICE and links to a government recruitment website featuring an image of Uncle Sam, the headline “AMERICA NEEDS YOU,” and the possibility of up to $60,000 in student loan repayment beyond those signing bonuses.
“ICE actively trying to use our partnership to recruit our personnel is wrong and we have expressed our concern to ICE leadership,” the Pinellas County, Florida Sheriff’s Office said in a statement to NBC News.
The sheriff in Pinellas County is a Republican, as is Polk County’s Judd.
“It was bad judgement that will cause an erosion of a relationship that has been improving of late. And it’s going to take some getting over and it’s gonna take leadership at DHS to really take stock cause hey, they need state and locals,” Jonathan Thompson, the executive director and CEO of the National Sheriffs’ Association, said in an interview with NBC News.
Thompson said that the association has heard from more than a dozen law enforcement agencies about the recruitment emails. He also said that the group has not heard from DHS since the emails were flagged to the association, and that he intends to send a “very stern note” to ICE.
“This is inappropriate behavior of a partner organization,” Thompson said. “We’re all on the same boat. And you just don’t treat friends or partners like this.”
One Florida chief of police who did not want to be named out of concern his department could face retaliation said departments that have partnered with the federal government now fear they could lose their best officers.
“Now you know why everybody’s so pissed,” the chief said.
“This is like the transfer portal in college sports,” the chief said, adding, “We see people leave us because they believe they can make more money at other locations… Law enforcement has always been a calling. Now it’s a job.”
The DHS press office did not respond to questions about local law enforcement concerns but provided NBC News with a statement that it attributed to a senior DHS official: “ICE is recruiting law enforcement, veterans, and other patriots who want to serve their country … This includes local law enforcement, veterans, and our 287(g) partners who have already been trained and have valuable law enforcement experience. Additionally, more than $500 million from President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill will go to increasing our 287(g) partnerships with state and local law enforcement.”
The sheriff’s office in Forsyth County, Georgia told NBC News that the Atlanta ICE office “sent an apology” for the recruitment email.
Not all sheriffs are upset with the recruitment effort. In fact some say they support it.
Thaddeus Cleveland, the sheriff of Terrell County, Texas, said, “I think if someone wants to better their life, better their career, you know, look towards the long years, the long game, retirement, there’s nothing better than the US government to go out and have a successful career.”
Cleveland, who has just four deputies on his staff, admits he can’t compete with the $50,000 bonuses that the agency is offering.
“We may not be able to turn around and hire somebody the next day. It may take a few weeks. It may take a few months. But again, I support, you know, someone wanting to pursue something they’re interested in. I may end up having to work a little more, which is okay.”
Goliad County Texas Sheriff Roy Boyd also said he’s not upset about the recruitment, and noted that his office also has to deal with the state recruiting new troopers from his department.
“We can’t compete with the salaries of the state and the feds,” he said.
ICE efforts to poach local officers anger some local law enforcement leaders
An email to officers whose agencies partner with ICE has even some sheriffs who support the Trump administration and its immigration crackdown seeing red.
